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SECURITY INFORMATION

1. Steps taken by East German regime prior to outbreaks.
2. Reasons for change in Soviet Policy.
3. What actually happened during outbreaks.
4. Significance of the outbreaks.

(a) Demonstrated a residue of resistance and a degree of hostility to the regime that must have surprised both the USSR and the West.

(b) Indicated that the Bereitchoften is not yet a reliable instrument of Soviet control or at least that the USSR did not so consider it.

(c) Demonstrated to the USSR that it cannot maintain its control over East Germany if Soviet troops withdrawn.

(d) Completely discredited the Communist East German government. For the first time Soviet troops had to be used to suppress the Communist Satellite regime. Difficult for the East German government to pose as an all German government.

(e) USSR reluctant to fire on East German mob. Raises questions of extent to which USSR can use force to deal with widespread disorders.

(f) Intensifies desire and demand for German unification in both East and West Germany. Is this likely to become an uncontrollable force which neither the western powers nor the USSR can control.

(g) The revolt of workers against a communist government may have a serious impact upon both communist and non-communist areas.

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5. Effects on Soviet Policy in East Germany.

(a) Apparently the USSR intends to carry through with its new mild policy in East Germany in spite of the uprisings as indicated by the announcement following the uprisings of a broad program involving even further concessions. This program appears to involve a temporary encouragement of private <sup>business</sup> factors of the economy and indefinite postponement of socialization of industry and agriculture.

(b) Possible modification in character of the East German government.

(c) Question remains as to whether Germans will accept these concessions and thus whether USSR will be able to carry them out without further bloodshed. If the East Germans do not accept them the USSR will be put on quite a spot.

6. Effects of Soviet Policy toward West Germany.

(1) If the USSR is successful <sup>in implementing</sup> its new policy with respect to East Germany it is likely to capitalize on the surge of unification sentiment in both West and East Germany to propose a four power conference on German unification, with two possible alternative objectives in view (if the western powers beat the USSR to the gun on a proposal for a four power conference on German unification the USSR would probably accept, <sup>and</sup> approach the conference with the same two alternative objectives).

(a) Merely to prevent the incorporation of West Germany in the western defense organization and to defeat Adenauer in the coming elections, with no intention of agreeing to a solution that ~~it~~ would involve relinquishing ~~all~~ Soviet control of East Germany. In other words to protract the negotiations until after the West German elections.

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(b) To agree to the creation of a unified, armed and neutral Germany on the basis of ~~a~~ free German elections which would involve withdrawal of both Soviet and Western forces and the subsequent relinquishing of Soviet control of East Germany.

We believe the first of these alternatives is the more likely, as we still believe that the USSR is unlikely to give up the certain military and economic advantages of its present control of East Germany for the sake of greater but uncertain gains in the future.

On the other hand the possibility cannot be ~~excluded~~ that the USSR might change its policy with respect to Germany while obviously not giving up its <sup>ultimate</sup> own objectives. Relying on its vastly increased power position and the desire that a re-armed unified Germany might create in the western camp, it might decide that it was advantageous to relieve the present tensions by agreeing to a unified, armed and neutral Germany even if it involved the relinquishing of Soviet control over East Germany. It might hope in this way ultimately to subvert Germany or to gain a Rapallo type of agreement.

Consideration should possibly also be given to a third alternative ~~to the~~ Soviet approach. The USSR might propose free elections based upon present ~~national~~ zonal divisions, the allies controlling the West and the Communist ~~in~~ the East, but offering to open the elections in the East to ~~zonal~~ inspections by the West. This would involve the participation of other parts than the SED in the East zone elections. The USSR might hope that the West Germans after what has happened recently in the East Zone might fall for this in the belief that regardless of control by the East Zone administration the East Germans would elect a majority of non communists. The USSR might make this proposal even if ~~it~~ estimated that the elections would result in a non-communist majority as they might in this manner have a nucleus of a strong Communist Party in the new all-German

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Legislature upon which they would count to turn Germany eventually to the East.

My guess is that the Russians <sup>would</sup> will not carry through on such proposals unless they were prepared to give up their control of East Germany but they might propose ~~that~~ it rather than agree to free all German elections, on the theory that it would be <sup>distasteful</sup> ~~dissatisfying~~ to the US while acceptable to the Germans, and thereby create greater confusion in the ~~the~~ western camp.